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Uruguay: Alternative Trade 
Strategies and Employment 
Implications 
Alberto Bension and Jorge Caumont 
Introduction 
Among the countries covered in this volume Uruguay is unique in sev- 
eral regards.  First, and most important in terms of  the study, Uruguay 
is the country where the least prior research has been  done and where 
data availability  poses  the severest  constraint  upon  analysis.  Second, 
Uruguay  is by  far the most  affluent  country  in  the study, with  a  per 
capita GDP of $1,190 in  1974  (World Bank  1976, p.  5). Many social 
indicators reflect this:  91 percent of  the population over seven years old 
is literate,  life expectancy at birth is sixty-eight years,  and population 
growth since 1908 has been about 1.2 percent per annum (Banco Cen- 
tral del Uruguay 1976a). 
However, from the mid-1950s until the early  1970s, Uruguay’s eco- 
nomic growth performance was almost as dismal as her initial standard 
of  living was favorable. Uruguay was  a very rich  agricultural exporter 
in the  1920s and shifted  policies toward  import substitution after the 
Great Depression and World  War 11.  This shift resulted  in an annual 
growth rate of  real GDP of  only  1.6 percent over the decade 1935-45, 
4.8 percent  over the next  ten years,  and 0.7 percent per  annum from 
1955  to  1974  (Banco  Central  del  Uruguay  1976b, p. 22-hereafter 
cited as BCU). Thus, per capita income in  1974 was probably  slightly 
below its level twenty years earlier and probably no higher than it was 
in the 1920s. 
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In this paper we  will  analyze the employment implications of  Uru- 
guay’s trade strategies. Focus is upon the year 1968, in the midst of the 
period  when  Uruguayan policies were directed heavily toward import 
substitution. The reason for this choice is, of  course, data availability. 
In 1972 Uruguay did begin altering her policies toward a more system- 
atic effort at export promotion. However, not enough time has elapsed 
since the change in orientation for us to interpret the results, and, in any 
event,  data  are not  available beyond  1975. Indeed,  for  purposes  of 
analysis, the terminal date for this study is  1974. When evidence does 
exist for later years that either strongly supports or tends to contradict 
the results based on an earlier period, that is indicated in the text or in 
the notes, as seems appropriate. However, by and large, experience with 
the altered trade and payments regime is far too limited to permit many 
inferences from it at this stage. 
11.1  Overview of  the Uruguayan Economy 
11.1.1  Growth 
Like  those  of  most  Latin  American countries, Uruguayan  policies 
shifted heavily toward protection of  the home market and the encour- 
agement of  new  industries during the Great Depression. Although, as 
already  noted,  growth  was  very  slow  during the  depression and  war 
years, the  initial decade after World War  I1  saw more rapid  growth, 
spurred  by  output  increases in  the nontraditional  industries. The  so- 
called protected  industries-those  sheltered behind stringent exchange 
control, high tariffs, and the usual range of  other protective devices- 
had contributed only 28.5 percent of  total industrial production in  1930; 
by  1955 their share had  risen to  40.5 percent  (Facultad  de Ciencias 
Econdmicas 1969). Also by  1955, half  of  industrial production repre- 
sented consumption goods, while imports were more heavily oriented 
toward capital goods, fuels, and raw materials (23, 16, and 42 percent 
of  total imports, respectively) (BCU 1955). 
From 1955 to 1974 growth was sufficiently slow so that one can dis- 
cuss the structure of  the economy without regard to a specific date. For 
example, agriculture’s contribution to  GDP was  16.6 percent in  1955 
and  15.3 in  1974 (BCU  1976b, pp.  4, 5). Crops and cattle retained 
their  relative  importance  within  agriculture:  cattle  accounted for  62 
percent  of  agricultural product  in  1955 and  averaged  the  same over 
1970-74.  There were fluctuations in that proportion  in the intervening 
years, but  they were  attributable to relative price changes rather than 
to underlying production shifts. As will be seen below, agriculture’s con- 
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The composition  of  Uruguay’s  GDP reflects one of  the factors  ac- 
counting for slow growth:  gross fixed capital formation fell from 15 or 
16 percent of  GDP in the early 1960s to an average of  only 10 percent 
in 1973-75  (BCU 19766, p. 1). Government consumption expenditure 
rose from about 10  to 13  percent of  GDP over that period, while private 
consumption expenditure remained fairly constant at about 75 percent. 
Exports of  goods and services have averaged about 14 percent of GDP 
in recent years, a significant drop from the 21 percent level in 1949-52, 
although these were the years of  the Korean War. Part of  the economic 
difficulties  experienced  over  the  next  two  decades  stemmed from  the 
need to curtail imports commensurately with the decline in export earn- 
ings. From 20 percent  of  GDP in  1960, imports of  goods and services 
declined to an average of  14 percent in 1970-74. 
That Uruguay’s attempt at inner-oriented  development  did  not suc- 
ceed is reflected clearly in the behavior of  industrial production  and its 
various sectoral components over 1955-74.  These data are given in table 
11.1. As can be seen, only two relatively small sectors (rubber products 
and paper products)  experienced growth rates over 5 percent,  and the 
growth  of  industrial production  as a whole averaged  only  1.1 percent 
per annum over the two decades. Industrial output constituted about 23 
percent  of  GDP during the 1960s, compared  with  about a  15 percent 
contribution for agriculture. Both these numbers are relatively low be- 





Rate of  Growth  1955  1965  1974 
20  Food products 
21  Beverages 
22  Tobacco products 
23  Textiles 
24  Clothing and footwear 
27  Paper  and paper  products 
28  Printing and publishing 
30 Rubber products 
31  Chemicals 
32  Fuel and fuel derivatives 
33  Nonmetallic mineral products 
35  Metal products 

































21.4  21.5 
8.2  9.6 
3.7  4.0 
14.2  10.0 
6.3  3.9 
2.2  2.8 
2.8  2.7 
1.6  2.2 
5.8  7.8 
5.5  4.9 
5.5  9.8 
3.0  1.4 
4.0  2.1 
15.8  17.3 
100.0  100.0 
Source: Banco Central del Uruguay  (BCU) 1970-766  (March 1976), p.  38. 502  Albert0 Bemion/ Jorge Caumont 
cause of  the large share of  the service sector in Uruguay: in 1955 and 
again in 1974 housing and services together accounted for over 61 per- 
cent of  GDP. 
1  1.1.2 
Table 11.2 gives data on Uruguay’s balance of  payments for selected 
years over the period  1953-74.  In general, import licenses have been 
issued to restrain imports to the available foreign exchange. When export 
earnings fell after  1953, imports were drastically reduced. Thereafter, 
the  value of  licenses issued  was based upon  export earnings. Capital 
flows and nonmerchandise trade items have been relatively unimportant 
in Uruguay’s balance of  payments most of  the time. In 1974, however, 
capital inflows were  a sizable offset to the negative balance on goods 
and services. 
Uruguay’s imports,  reflecting  the  high  degree of  protection  of  the 
domestic market for manufactured goods, have consisted predominantly 
of  fuels and raw materials. Capital equipment imports constituted  18 
percent of  the total over  1955-59  and fell to 13 percent in  1970-74, 
influenced by  the low level of  capital f0rmation.l Imports in the years 
1965-69  averaged  $165  million, c.i.f., compared  with  an average of 
$203 million, c.i.f.,  in  1955-59.  As with most  Latin  American coun- 
tries, the fraction of  imports originating with the Latin American Free 
Trade Area  (LAFTA) trading partners  increased, going from 19 per- 
cent in  1955 to 34 percent  in  1974. The United States share of  Uru- 
International Trade and Payments 
Table 11.2  Uruguay’s Balance of  Payments, Selected Years, 1953-74 
(Millions of  U.S. Dollars) 
~~  ~  ~~ 
1953  1958  1963  1968  1974 
Exports, f.0.b.  269  155  166  179  381 
Imports, f.0.b.  2748  124  152  135  43  3 
Trade balance  -5  31  15  43  -  52 
Services  n.a.b -  17  -  19  -  27  -  83 
Transfers  n.a.  1  4  7  17 
Goods and services balance  n.a.  14  - 4  16  -135 
Capital  n.a.  10  -  5  24  112 
Monetary authorities  n.a.  12  3  -  37  80 
Deposit money banks  n.a.  9  4  15  -  6 
Net errors and omissions  n.a.  -  22  -  2  -  25  -  68 
Sources:  1974,  BCU  1970-76  (October  1976);  1968,  BCU  1970-76  (1970); 
1963,  1958, and  1963, BCU, Departamento de Investigaciones Economicas, Bal- 
ance of  Payments Series, various issues, especially 1970. 
ac.i.f. 
bn.a. =  not available. 503  Uruguay: Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment Implications 
guay’s  imports  fell  from  18 to 7  percent  over  that period,  while  the 
EEC share dropped from 32 to 17 percent  (Oficina de Planeamiento y 
Presupuesto  1973). In the later  part of  the period,  Uruguay’s imports 
of  oil increased,  thus  increasing the share of  imports originating from 
the rest of  the world. 
Table  11.3 gives  some detail  on the composition  of  exports  from 
1950 to 1974. As can be seen, nonagricultural  exports were negligible 
until the late 1960s. Among agricultural commodities, animal products 
constituted the major portion. Meat and by-products  have increased in 
relative and absolute importance over the years, while export earnings 
from wool and wool products have decreased in both respects since the 
early 1950s. These shifts, however, reflect the behavior of  international 
prices:  export volumes fluctuated over the twenty-year  period  with no 
clear trend. 
Historically, the EEC countries  were  Uruguay’s  largest  customers, 
taking more than half her exports. In 1960 that figure reached 60 per- 
cent. Thereafter, however, the EEC share fell steadily, reaching 28 per- 
cent in  1974.2 The United  States was  never  a large customer, with  a 
maximum share of  17 percent in  1965. That share also fell thereafter, 
as exports to LAFTA increased from 2 percent of  the total in 1960 to 
36 percent in 1974.3 
1  1.1.3  Labor Market 
Uruguay  is  unusual  among the countries  in the project in that her 
demographic  characteristics  are much  more  like  those  of  developed 
countries than like those of  other LDCs. Only 28 percent of  the popu- 
lation was under fifteen years of  age in 1975 (compared with 45 percent 
in  Thailand, for example), and  12.7 percent  were  over  sixty.  In like 
vein,  80.8 percent  of  the population  resided in urban  areas,  and  20.2 
percent of  the labor force was employed in the manufacturing sector in 
1975, down from 23 percent in 1963. Population  growth averaged 0.6 
percent per annum during 1960-70  and is estimated to have been only 
1.3 percent annually from 1908 to 1960. The potential labor force (de- 
fined  as persons fourteen years of  age and older)  actually fell between 
the 1963 and  1975 censuses. Educational standards  are also high, and 
91 percent  of the population  over seven years  of  age is  classified as 
literate. 
Thus, the “employment problem” in Uruguay is not one of  a rapidly 
growing labor force. It is rather the productive and efficient utilization 
of the labor force. Unemployment in Montevideo has been fairly steady, 
officially estimated at about 8 percent  of  the labor force from  1968 to 
1974, although the rate has risen since then. Value added per employee 
is estimated to have been $2,023 in 1972 United States dollars in 1973; Table 11.3 
Product  1950-54  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-72  1973-74 
Composition of  Uruguay’s Exports, 1950-74  (Millions of U.S. Dollars and Percentage of  Total, Annual Average) 
Wool and wool textiles  135.1 (55)  99.5 (62) 
Meat and by-products  44.0 (18)  18.9 (12) 
Hides  24.3  (10)  12.3  (8) 
Other agricultural products  36.1 (15)  29.1 (18) 
Total exports  243.5  160.0 
Source: Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto 1973. 
Other exports  4.0  (2)  -2 (-) 
~  ~ 
86.6 (54)  85.3 (47)  69.6 (32)  101.9 (29) 
135.4 (38)  40.8  (26)  55.3 (30)  86.6 (40) 
17.0 (11)  17.6 (10)  23.0 (11)  24.8  (8) 
13.4  (8)  17.4  (9)  24.9 (11)  39.2 (11) 
7.5  (4)  13.4  (6)  50.0 (14)  2.2  (1) 
160.0  183.1  217.5  351.9 505  Uruguay: Alternative Trade Strategies grid Employment Implications 
in  1960 it was  $1,958  (in 1972 United  States dollars)  (World Bank 
1976). This level was exceptionally  high in  1960 and still well above 
that of  most other Latin American countries in  1973. But the startling 
part of  those numbers is the lack of  growth of  labor productivity  and 
the lack of  growth of  manufacturing employment. Stagnation of  employ- 
ment and productivity have been Uruguay’s chief problems in her labor 
markets and throughout the economy. 
Very few data are available to analyze the functioning of  the labor 
market in Uruguay. Like most  other high-inflation countries, Uruguay 
has had a negative real interest rate and an overvalued  currency, both 
of  which  have tended  to  make  capital  goods artificially cheap and to 
encourage  the  use  of  capital-intensive  techniques.  Although  the  real 
price  of  capital goods began  rising  after about  1968 as  the  exchange 
rate became more realistic, high social security taxes and other taxes on 
the employment of  labor, combined with the influence of  unions, prob- 
ably prevented  any increase in the relative  price of  capital that might 
otherwise have occurred. Taxes on wages rose from 12 percent in 1955 
to 28.5 percent in 1967. Thus, although the real wage received by indus- 
trial workers  probably remained  about constant, the wage paid by em- 
ployers rose in real terms and was probably high to begin with. 
1  1.1.4  Inflation 
Inflationary pressures have been experienced by Uruguay throughout 
the postwar  period.  Inflation rates were already high in the early post- 
war years, averaging about 12  percent annually between 1950 and 1954. 
Thereafter inflation accelerated. For 1955-60  the annual rate was just 
over 20 percent. By the second half of  the 1960s it was 71 percent, and 
it remained almost that high in the first half of  the 1970s (see table 11.4 
below). 
It is not the purpose of  this study to analyze the causes of  Uruguayan 
inflation.4 What is important for understanding the environment within 
which  the trade and payments regime  operated is that the Uruguayan 
authorities first attempted to reduce or eliminate inflation through con- 
trols  over  the exchange rate, the interest rate,  and prices of  a limited 
number  of  commodities  considered  necessities,  and  afterward  (June 
1968) through a general freeze on prices  and wages. Thereafter, until 
1975 it was illegal to increase prices for any commodity or service with- 
out seeking prior approval of  the Ministry of  Finance. In addition to the 
misallocations  of  resources  that  resulted  from this  policy,  there  also 
ensued  considerable excess demand  for foreign  exchange,  as the price 
controls served, at least to some extent, to keep prices below the level 
they would have reached had market forces been  permitted to operate 
freely. 506  Albert0 Bemion/ Jorge Caumont 
11.2 
1 1.2.1 
The Uruguayan Trade and Payments Regime about 1968 
Emphasis on Import Restriction 
Starting with  the balance of  payments difficulties that were encoun- 
tered at the beginning of  the Great Depression, the Uruguayan trade and 
payments regime evolved into  a highly  restrictive, import  substitution 
oriented control system. Initially, the controls were imposed as a direct 
response to balance of  payments deficits. For this purpose, import li- 
censing was instituted, and controls were exercised over both the com- 
modity  composition  and  the  country  of  origin  of  imports.  Multiple 
exchange rates were also instituted at that time, and tariffs were raised 
on those commodities for which import licenses were issued. Controls 
extended to the outright prohibition of imports of  some commodities. 
Gradually, the system evolved from its original purpose of  restricting 
the flow of imports into one designed to foster domestic industrial pro- 
duction. In this process, export earnings stagnated, and the system be- 
came highly restrictive. As excess demand for imports intensified, addi- 
tional instruments of  control were employed. Tariffs were imposed on 
imports, along with  a variety of  additional charges. Complex methods 
of  valuation were devised for establishing the base upon which import 
duties were to be levied. Prior deposits, special levies, and other charges 
were also applied. The end result was a system that was highly detailed 
and specific, and few generalizations can withstand close scrutiny. An 
additional consequence is  that  it  is very  difficult to gather  data  that 
accurately capture the nature of  the system. 
Nonetheless, it  is  against this background of  more than  thirty years 
of restrictive trade  and payments practices that we  must interpret the 
trade and payments regime of  1968, the year on which this analysis of 
the employment implications of  alternative trade strategies focuses. At 
that time imports were regulated by various instruments applied by vari- 
ous public institutions. Quotas, in some cases prior guarantee deposits 
of  long duration, and a complicated tariff system that included preferen- 
tial  margins for other LAFTA members served to restrict imports in 
general and imports of  competing goods in particular. Export policy as 
of  1968 was simpler. Traditional natural resource based (NRB) exports 
-basically  meat,  wool,  and  hides-were  taxed,  while nontraditional 
exports were favored by  a subsidy system that was started in the mid- 
1960s and gradually consolidated since then. 
In this section, therefore, attention first turns to the behavior of  the 
real exchange rate. Next, the surcharges and subsidies that distinguish 
the effective exchange from the nominal exchange rate  are examined. 
We then briefly analyze the system of  quantitative restrictions as it was 
in  1968. Thereafter,  the effective rates of  protection  for a variety  of 
goods are calculated. Finally, an assessment is made of  the overall effect 
of  the trade and payments regime on various categories of  goods, and 507  Uruguay: Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment Implications 
the implications of  those findings for interpretation of  the estimates of 
employment are examined. 
Real Exchange Rates 
We  have  already  noted  that  Uruguay  experienced  rapid  inflation 
throughout the postwar period. By 1950 the exchange rate was probably 
already  overvalued, though  it  is  difficult to  estimate by  how much  in 
light of  the relatively  high  prices  received  in world  markets for Uru- 
guay’s exports at that time. Table 11.4 gives basic data on the official 
Table  11.4  Inflation and the  Real Nominal Exchange Rate, 1950-75 
Price Indexb 
Year  Official Exchange Ratea  (1961=  100)  PLD-NERC 
1950  1.9  17  11.18 
1951  1.9  21  9.05 
1952  1.9  23  8.26 
1953  1.9  25  7.60 
1954  1.9  27  7.04 
1955  2.1  30  7.00 
1956  2.9  32  9.22 
1957  3.6  37  9.81 
1958  3.5  45  7.91 
1959  3.5  67  5.25 
1960  11.0  91  12.12 
1961  10.9  100  10.98 
1962  10.9  111  9.89 
1963  16.4  160  10.25 
1964  18.7  216  8.66 
1965  59.9  407  14.72 
1966  75.8  607  12.50 
1967  200.0  1,433  13.96 
1968  250.0  2,383  10.49 
1969  250.0  2,729  9.16 
1970  250.0  3,300  7.58 
1971  370.0  4,477  8.26 
1972  718.0  8,716  8.24 
1973  937.0  15,472  6.06 
1974  1,586.0  32,065  4.95 
1975  2,660.0  53,497  4.97 
1976  4,000.0  74,896  5.34 
Source:  Banco Central del Uruguay  1970-766. 
Note:  aselling price of the United  States dollar  in  the  commercial  market  at the 
end of  each year. 
bcost  of  living-Dec./Dec. 
cPLD-NER =  Price level deflated nominal  (i.e., official) exchange rate. 508  Albert0 Bendon/ Jorge Caumont 
(or nominal)  exchange  rate  and  the  price  index for the years  since 
1950. As can be seen, the official exchange rate was increased by only 
85 percent  between  1950 and 1959, while the price level quadrupled. 
The result was a drastic decline in the deflated nominal exchange rate 
from  11.18 pesos per dollar in  1950 to 5.25 in  1959. After that year, 
the greater frequency of  devaluations prevented the real exchange rate 
from again reaching that level until the mid-l970s, but there were none- 
theless large fluctuations in the real purchasing power of  the peso.  By 
1968 the real purchasing power  of  the peso  had almost  reattained  its 
1950 level, although it is doubtful that the exchange rate played as much 
of a role in equilibrating supply and demand,for  pesos in 1968 as it did 
in  1950: it will be recalled  that price controls resulted in some under- 
statement of  the rate of  price increase during the 1960s, and also that 
the Uruguayan economy had grown  at a moderate rate between  1950 
and 1968, without any increase in export earnings. Finally, table  11.5 
shows the evolution of  the effective exchange rate in nominal and real 
terms from 1967 to 1976. 
Additional Charges on Imports 
The most important of  the measures designed to contain the demand 
for imports was a system of  “exchange surcharges” levied at rates rang- 
ing, in  1968, as  high  as  225 percent,  depending on the nature of  the 
commodity involved. The chief purpose was to protect domestic indus- 
tries,  and  rates  were  generally  highest  when  competing  domestically 
produced  goods were available.  The exchange surcharge was generally 
levied on the c.i.f. value, but in some instances the authorities also set 
“minimum”  prices  for imports,  and in  these  cases the  surcharge  was 
levied on either the c.i.f. value or the assessed “minimum” price, which- 
ever was higher. 
In addition to the exchange surcharges in 1968, imports were subject 
to a complex system of  tariffs. The first component of  the tariff system 
was a general duty on imports at a rate of  18 percent of  the c.i.f. value, 
from which there  were many  partial  or total  exemptions.  Thus,  some 
commodities were subjected to an 18 percent rate, some to 10.8 percent, 
some to 2.7 percent, and some to no duty at all. In addition to the gen- 
eral duty, there was a variable levy on imports. The rates of  this second 
component  of  the tariff  system varied  between  20 and 110 percent  of 
the c.i.f. value of  the goods. As in the case of  the exchange surcharges, 
some products  were taxed  according to an assessed value  at domestic 
prices. In such cases, given the rapid rate  of  Uruguayan inflation,  the 
importance  of  these  variable  duties  diminished  over  time.  Something 
similar happened with the last component of  the tariff  system, the spe- 
cific taxes that were applied in domestic currency on imports of  particu- 
lar commodities. Table 11.5  Inflation and the Effective Exchange Rate, 1967-76 
Imports  Traditional Exports  Nontraditional Exports 
Official 
(Ur.$/U.S.$)  %  (Ur.$/U.S.$)  (1967 Ur.$)  %  (Ur.$/U.S.$)  (1967 Ur.$)  %  (Ur.$/U.S.$)  (1967 Ur.16) 
Exchange Rate  Taxes  EER  PLD-EER  Taxes  EER  PLD-EER  Subsidies  EER  PLD-EER 





































































































Sources: Col. 1: BCU 1970-76b; col. 2: Import duty collections divided by  value of  imports,  c.i.f.,  from BCU  1970-76a.  Pesos were  con- 
verted into dollars using the annual average of  the commercial rate of  exchange. Columns 5 and 8 are from table 11.6. 
"In  1971 a short-term surcharge of  Ur. $120 on the selling price of  foreign currency was imposed. 
EER =  Effective exchange rate. 
PLD-EER =  Price-level-deflated effective exchange rate. 
The EERs in cols. 3 and 4 pertain to commodities that were actually imported.  Tariffs were  prohibitive  for some items, and premiums  ac- 
crued on import licenses. These are not included. See text. 510  Albedo BensiodJorge Caumont 
In addition to the exchange surcharges and the tariff  system, port fees 
also acted as a tax on imports. The fees considerably exceeded any cost 
that could reasonably have been incurred by the port authorities, as they 
ranged from 13 to 19 percent of  c.i.f. value. 
Finally, in 1968 “consular fees” were paid at about 12 percent of the 
f.0.b.  value  of  the goods.  Although  there  were  numerous  exemptions 
(basic consumer goods, raw materials, agricultural inputs, and machin- 
ery and equipment), this tax was included  as a part of  the legal basis 
on which other taxes were collected. 
As we have already mentioned, there were numerous exemptions and 
special  treatments  for particular  categories  of  commodities.  Notable 
among these was  the preferential treatment  accorded  to goods  traded 
within LAFTA. With  all the special categories,  exemptions, and regu- 
lations, the administration of the import regime was often chaotic. Tariff 
policy  was  applied by  such different  means for different commodities, 
and in such an incoherent manner, that many unintended outcomes re- 
sulted. For example, many  final products  ended  up subject to import 
duties at rates lower than those imposed on the raw materials used  in 
their  production.  Because of  the reliance upon  assessed values,  which 
lost meaning as inflation continued, and the flexibility of  the exchange 
surcharge system, the latter increased in importance over time. Whereas 
this tax accounted for 35 percent  of total foreign trade taxes collected 
in 1955, by  1963 it accounted for 80 percent. 
Quantitative Controls on Imports 
As we have already mentioned, in 1968 there were physical controls 
along with surcharges and levies. In general, each importer was assigned 
a quota according to the amount he had imported in prior years. Imports 
were not permitted without a quota, and there was little flexibility in the 
assignment  of  quotas.  Indeed,  prior  deposit  requirements  for import 
applications without licenses were in practice so high as to be prohibi- 
tive. The only exception to the rigid licensing system arose in instances 
where particular firms could  demonstrate that  they could not continue 
to produce, and that employment would thereby be harmed, if  they did 
not receive larger imports. This practice provided some flexibility, espe- 
cially for large firms that were better able to avail themselves of  these 
provisions. 
Export Taxes and Subsidies 
The export regime as applied in 1968 distinguished in effect between 
two  categories  of  exports : traditional  commodities  (chiefly  meat  and 
unprocessed wool and hides) and nontraditional exports. Taxes on tradi- 
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to between  12 and 26 percent of export receipts and were an important 
source of  revenue for the government. 
Nontraditional exports were increasingly  encouraged by  the govern- 
ment. The subsidy system applied to them started in the mid-1960s  and 
was increased in scope and importance thereafter. It was set as a per- 
centage of  the f.0.b. value of  exports, and the rates were determined for 
individual export industries. Table 11.6 gives data on the relative impor- 
tance  of  taxes  on traditional  exports  and subsidies on  nontraditional 
ones. As can be seen, after  1970 and except for 1972 subsidies ranged 
from 16 to 20 percent of  the value of  nontraditional exports. 
In addition  to the subsidies  established  for nontraditional  exports, 
exporters were accorded the right to import needed intermediate goods 
duty free, and also capital goods employed in exporting industries. Be- 
cause the commodities exported received the higher  effective exchange 
rate resulting from the export subsidy, these duty-free imports consti- 
tuted yet another incentive for exports of  nontraditional items. 
Effective  Rates of Protection 
The foregoing discussion gives some idea of  the levels of  protection 
(or discrimination)  but provides little idea of  the variation  among in- 
dustries. To that end, we calculated  weighted average rates of  effective 
protection facing each two-digit industrial sector, according to whether 
the output was exported or sold in the internal market. The results are 
Table 11.6  Tax  Collections and  Subsidy Payments on Exports,  1967-76 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Traditional Exports  Nontraditional Exports 
Value  Taxes  Value  Subsidies 
(1)  (2)  (2)/(1)  (3)  (4)  (4)  / (3  1 
1967  132 
1968  147 
1969  149 
1970  174 
1971  147 
1972  163 
1973  236 
1974  238 
1975  194 



















































Sources:  Cols.  1 and 3: Direccidn General de Comercio Exterior,  1975-76. 
Col. 2:  BCU  (1970-76a).  Pesos were  converted to dollars at the annual average 
of  the commercial rate of  exchange. 
Col. 4: Revista Blisqueda  (1976), p.  51, converting pesos to dollars as in col. 2. 512  Albert0 BensiodJorge Caumont 
given in table 11  .7.5 In some instances the legal rates proved to be re- 
dundant, because domestic demand was satisfied by domestic production 
and few, if any, imports resulted. Indeed, the entire system of  protection 
was designed to induce this result:  once domestic production capability 
was established, the tariffs, other  charges,  and quotas imposed on im- 
ports  were  designed  to  protect  domestic  production  and  discourage 
imports  completely.  For export  industries,  the NRPs and ERPs were 
calculated using the actual  subsidy rates,  and there is every reason  to 
believe that the rates reflect fairly accurately the actual rates of  protec- 
tion for exporters. 
In many  sectors the legal ERPs for the domestic market  shown in 
table  11.7 at the  two-digit  level  strikingly  exceed  those  for  export. 
Where the information was  available for the component industries, an 
export  subsidy  rate  was  used  to  estimate  effective protection  for the 
internal market in order to calculate international value added  (see the 
model in section  11.3.4). The spread between NRPs for domestic  and 
export  sales was taken  as evidence of  redundancy in the tariff for the 
protection of  the internal market. Recent studies based upon direct price 
comparisons  have confirmed  that  there  is water  in  the nominal tariff 
structure despite high levels of  effective protection. 
Using the export rates as indicators of  the true protection of  the inter- 
nal  market,  we  find  two  types  of  industry  for which  ERPs are low: 
those with an important NRB content that produce for both the internal 
and  external  markets-numbers  23  (textiles),  and  29  (leather  and 
leather products)-and  two capital goods sectors-numbers  36 (machin- 
ery)  and  37 (electrical machinery).  These  rates,  combined with high 
rates  on other  commodities  and  wide differences  among  industries  in 
value added/output  ratios, have resulted in a large coefficient of  varia- 
tion-74-in  the ERP rates. In the case of  export industries, the rela- 
tive dispersion was not as large, the coefficient of  variation being 58. 
A final observation on the structure of  ERPs pertains to their height. 
Given  that  they  are all  high  when  domestic  production  takes  place, 
there  seems to be no clear  bias  in  resource  allocation to a particular 
industry  within  the  nontraditional  sector.  A  priori,  one might  expect 
that, under  an all-out  import substitution regime, protection  would be 
as high as necessary to stimulate domestic production. In Uruguay this 
would  imply that ERPs  and  capital/labor  ratios  should  be in  a direct 
and strong relationship. However, correlation analysis showed a nonsig- 
nificant statistical result, suggesting that other factors were involved. 
The data in  table  11.7 show  strikingly  high  levels  of  nominal  and 
effective protection for the industries the government was trying to en- 
courage. To test the hypothesis that these protective rates were prohibi- 
tive, we took a sample of  324 goods produced in the country in  1968. 
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tion in that year. The results obtained from the sample are given in table 
11.8. The first column gives the value of  production in the sample of 
commodities relative to the entire output of  the sector in question. The 
second column gives the value of  production. The third column indicates 
the number of  different products  in the sample, and the fourth  shows 
Table 11.7  Nominal and Effective Protection Rates, 1968 
Industry 
~~~~  ~  ~~  ~~ 
Production for  Production 
Domestic Market  for Export 
NRP  ERP  NRP  ERP 
























Wood and cork products 
Furniture 
Paper and paper products 
Printing and publishing 
Leather and leather products 
Rubber products 
Chemicals and chemical products 
Petroleum  and coal products 
Nonmetallic  mineral products 
Primary metals 
Metal products 
Nonelectrical  machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Transportation  equipment 


















































































Note:  n.e. =  no exports; n.a. =  not available; NRP =  nominal  rate of  protection. 
NRP coefficients were calculated from tariff  schedules and the following  taxes: 
exchange surcharges and other tariffs for internal  market industries,  and subsidies 
for export  industries.  The NRPs at the two-digit level and the aggregate NRP for 
the industrial  sector as a whole  are weighted averages of  the NRPs for the goods 
included in a sample  (see table  11.8) used by  the Banco Central to estimate peri- 
odically the level of  industrial  activity in the country (weights being the share of 
each good in the value of  industrial  output). To  estimate the components of  the 
ERP, a study  was  conducted of  the  input-output  structure of  the  goods  included 
in  the sample. Cost  declarations  for these goods submitted to the  Ministry of  Fi- 
nance  in  1968 and to the Ministry of  Industry  in  1975 were  the sources for the 
ERP estimates.  The input  structure was  classified according to the origin  of  the 
inputs.  For inputs  reported  to  have  been  imported,  only  the  c.i.f.  values  were 
taken; tariffs  and other taxes were  excluded. The value  of  internal inputs was di- 
vided into (1) domestic, (2) imported but purchased locally, and (3) nontradables. 
Domestic taxes were excluded. 514  Albert0 Bension/Jorge Caumont 
Table 11.8  Principal Manufactures Produced in 1968 and 
Competing Imports 
Number of 
Number.of  Products in  Ratio of 
VP8/VP, M/VP8  Products  Sample also  (4) to (3) 
%  %  insample  Imported  % 
Industry  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
20  Food products  80.6 
21  Beverages  70.1 
22  Tobacco products  95.4 
23  Textiles  94.4 
24  Footwear  60.4 
27  Paper and paper  90.6 
30 Rubber products  96.0 
3 1 Chemicals and  46.1 
chemical products 
32  Petroleum and coal  95.1 
products 
33 Nonmetallic  83.5 
mineral products 
35 Metal products  73.4 
37 Electrical  54.2 
38  Transportation  15.0 
39  Miscellaneous  43.1 





2.4  61 
0  15 
0  3 
0  27 
0  39 
8.3  22 
0  5 
0.6  36 
8.6  5 
0.2  24 
12.3  51 
0.5  14 
0  5 
0.5  17 

























Source: The table was constructed by considering the components of  the industrial 
sample of  the Banco Central del Uruguay and their  relative importance in manu- 
facturing  in  1968 and using  import series  for that year-classified  by  product- 
published by the Banco de la Republica. 
Note:  (1) VP, =  Value of  production of  the industrial products that compose the 
sample that the Banco Central del Uruguay uses to estimate the level of  industrial 
activity every three months; VP, =  Value of production  of  the industrial sector. 
(2) M =  Value of  imports of  goods similar to the ones domestically produced and 
included in the sample cited above. 
the number of those products of  which there were imports of  a similar 
type. For each commodity listed we examined the import list to deter- 
mine whether there was  import competition for the particular  good in 
question. As can be seen, only for forty-six of  them were  any similar 
imports found. The values of  imports that competed at all with domestic 
production represented only 2.1 percent of  domestic production. Even 
then, they may not have been strict substitutes. Although sample data 
can  never be  entirely convincing, it  seems evident that  imports were 
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It thus seems clear that rates of  protection were so high that whatever 
was  domestically produced  was  not  imported.  Conversely, what  was 
imported was not  domestically produced. Imports consisted mainly of 
intermediate inputs, crude oil, and capital goods. They all had relatively 
low tariffs, which explains why import duty collections as a percentage 
of  value of  imports shown in table  11.5 were so small contrasted with 
the high nominal tariff rates shown in table 11.7. 
1  1.2.2  Resource Allocation Resulting from the Trade Regime 
Although one cannot pinpoint the precise pulls of  resources within 
the modem manufacturing sector in Uruguay, it does seem possible to 
categorize Uruguayan industries into several meaningful groups. First, 
as exemplified by meat and leather, there are some traditional manufac- 
turing activities that are based on domestic natural resources and enjoy 
costs of  production sufficiently low to enable them to sell abroad even 
if  they are not highly efficient. Second, there are some industries, such 
as textiles, clothing, and cement, that, though using outputs based on 
domestic natural resources, could not export, at prevailing official ex- 
change rates, were it not for the subsidies they receive. Finally, a third 
group utilizes imported raw materials and parts behind high  levels of 
protection.  It  is  this  group, producing  only  for the  domestic market 
behind excessively high  tariff  walls, that is  subject to the largest com- 
parative  disadvantage and  is  the  chief  beneficiary  of  the  protection 
system. 
It is the protection of  this third group that prevents the emergence of 
either of  the first two groups as  exporters on a significant scale. The 
import barriers  erected to protect the high-cost industries also permit 
maintenance of  an overvalued currency that acts as an implicit tax on 
the exportation of the output of  the other industries and diminishes the 
incentive to expand the production of exportables. The subsidies to non- 
traditional industrial exports compensate this second group of  industries 
in part for the overvaluation of  the currency. However, those subsidies, 
as we  have  already seen, constitute only about  15-20  percent  of the 
nominal exchange rate, whose variation in real terms over the years has 
considerably exceeded that  amount.  Moreover, the  subsidies to non- 
traditional exports,  while  offsetting to some extent the  discrimination 
against them, enable still further discrimination against the traditional 
exporting activities in which comparative advantage is very large. This 
is because exports of  nontraditional commodities are higher because of 
the subsidy than they would  otherwise be,  and so the pressure on the 
Uruguayan government to adjust the exchange rate is less than it wpuld 
be in the absence of  those exports. 
There can  be  little doubt that the Uruguayan trade  and  payments 
regime has  transferred income from  consumers, importers, and tradi- 516  Albert0 Bension/Jorge Caumont 
tional exporters to import substituting producers. In addition there is a 
net real cost of  the system, since the social cost of  domestic production 
of  import  substitutes is considerably  higher than that abroad, and the 
marginal rate of  transformation domestically exceeds considerably that 
on world markets. The precise outcome of  the system for the producers 
of  nontraditional exports is less clear, and it is not evident whether that 
group on balance benefits or loses from the protective system as  con- 
trasted with an efficient allocation of  resources. 
It is against  this background  of  complex controls  and a pattern  of 
production vastly different from that which would obtain under optimal 
resource allocation that the data for 1968 must be viewed when exam- 
ining the employment implications of  alternative trade strategies. 
11.3  Labor Intensity of  Industries 
11.3.1  Industry Classification 
Our analysis of  the labor intensity  of  Uruguayan  trade is based  on 
the  1968 industrial census and data available at the three-digit level of 
the International Standard Industrial Classification for a sample of  350 
goods. Those goods represent more than 80 percent of  total industrial 
output. These data were combined with cost data described in the notes 
to table 11.7. Data from the costs declarations lodged before COPRIN 
(the prices and wages controller) in 1974 and 1975 were used to obtain 
producer prices  and a breakdown  of  costs,  including the value  of  im- 
ported  inputs,  domestic  inputs,  and  taxes.  For exportable  goods,  we 
obtained  additional  data on sales prices  abroad. Despite the difficulty 
of  developing accurate and comparable data against the background of 
high rates of  inflation and the inherent problems associated in melding 
1968 and  1974-75  data, the sample is believed to be representative of 
the input-output cost structure of  the Uruguayan industrial sector. 
Commodity classifications among the three-digit  industries were  as 
follows. All agricultural and mining activities were classified  as NRB, 
as were seven manufacturing branches: meat (201  ) ,  alcoholic beverages 
(21  3)  , wool-washing  (230) , wool  tops  (23  1  ) , other  textiles  (239), 
tanned hides (29  1  ) ,  and the edible oil industry (3  12). All these sectors 
had exports primarily to the developed countries, except alcoholic bev- 
erages, which exports primarily  to other developing countries. 
All  the remaining  manufacturing sectors were classified as HOS in- 
dustries,  except  for furniture  (26), printing  (281), and  oil  refining 
(321), which were judged to be home goods, as were all energy, trans- 
portation, and financial activities. 
Among the HOS industries, six-dairy  products (202), wool spinning 
and weaving  (234) ,  footwear  (24  1  ) , clothing  (243), textiles  (244) , 517  Uruguay: Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment Implications 
and leather products  (292)-were  classified as HOS exportables to de- 
veloped  countries,  and  five-fish-preserving  (204),  parquets  (254), 
tires  (301), glass products (332), and cement  (334)-as  HOS export- 
ables to developing countries. Twenty three-digit sectors were classified 
as HOS importables:  grain products  (205), sugar (207), tobacco prod- 
ucts  (220),  cordage  (233  ),  sawmilling  (25  1  ),  paper  (270), paper 
products  (274), other paper industries (279), molded rubber products 
(302), industrial chemicals (3  1  1  ), secondary chemical products  (3  13), 
household  chemical  products  (3  15  ) , pharmaceuticals  (3  16), cement 
products  (335), nonmetallic  mineral  products  (339), iron  and  steel 
(241  ), nonferrous  metals  (342), machinery  and repair  (362), motor 
vehicles (383), and bicycles (385). The same classification was applied 
to three entire two-digit sectors: metal products (35), electrical machin- 
ery (37), and miscellaneous manufacturing (39). Finally, several indus- 
tries  were classified as production  not  competing with  imports.  These 
included industries within the metal manufacturing, machinery, electrical 
appliances, and transportation  equipment sectors. 
The criterion for classification based on the Ti statistic defined in the 
introductory chapter (i.e., ratio of net imports to consumption in indus- 
try  i) was as follows: 
exportable if  Ti less than 0; 
import-competing if  0 < Ti < 0.7; 
noncompeting import if  0.7 < Ti. 
Table  11.9 indicates  the relative  importance in trade of  the various 
categories. As can be seen, NRB exports were  93 percent  of  total ex- 
ports  in  1968, the greater part being destined for developed countries. 
Table 11.9  Composition and Direction of  Uruguay’s Trade in 1968 
(Millions of  U.S. Dollars) 
Developing  Developed 
Countries  Countries  Total 
Exports 
NRB goods  21.1  146.2  167.3 
HOS goods  7.2  4.7  11.3 
Total  28.3  150.9  179.2 
NRB goods  30.5  11.0  41.5 
Import-competing HOS goods  17.6  13.6  31.2 
Noncompeting HOS imports  18.4  51.1  69.5 
Totala  66.5  75.7  142.2 
Imports 
Source: Bension and Caumont (1977). 
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Since the reforms  in the rnid-l970s,  of  course,  this  concentration  in 
NRB goods has diminished somewhat. On the import side, noncompet- 
ing imports and NRB goods predominated in trade, reflecting the degree 
of  protection  given to domestic import substitution industries.  In 1977 
petroleum, intermediate goods, and capital goods imports accounted for 
93 percent of  total Uruguayan imports. 
Tables 1  1.10 and 1  1.1  1 give trade and factor intensities (discussed in 
section  11.3.3)  of major HOS exportables and importable production. 
Note,  as observed  above,  that  most  exportables  are concentrated  in 
NRB processing  activities and  importables  are concentrated  in  food- 
stuffs and consumer goods. 
11.3.2  Variables Indicating Factor Intensity 
Three separate variables are used here to measure labor coefficients: 
total wage bill, number of  workers, and hours worked. In addition, two 
separate indicators of skills are available,  one being a classification of 
white-collar  and  blue-collar  workers  and  the  other  a classification of 
skilled  and unskilled  workers.  Both  of  these  measures  were  deemed 
superior  to  attempting to  use  average wages per worker  or per  hour 
worked  as  an  indicator  of  skills.  This was  primarily  because,  in  the 
Uruguayan context, inflation is sufficiently rapid that the average wage 
variable may be a better indicator of  the month in the year when wage- 
increases were  granted  than it is of  the skill composition of  the labor 
force: for the year under review, inflation was 60 percent. 
In addition to measures of  skill and labor intensity, there is available 
a  measure  of  kilowatt  consumption  of  various  industries.  As  is  well 
known, this measure is not entirely satisfactory because of  the availabil- 
ity of  other energy sources and because some forms of  capital are not 
as intensive in energy use as others. Nonetheless, we deem it worthwhile 
to examine the “electricity coefficient” as at least a partial proxy for the 
capital intensity of  various industries. 
11.3.3 
Tables 11.10 and 11.11 give factor intensities in major HOS export- 
ables and importables, while table 11.12 gives estimates of  direct factor 
utilization per unit of  DVA by commodity category and, for wages only, 
also provides estimates of  direct plus home goods indirect requirements. 
Weights used in the calculations were the domestic value added of  pro- 
duction.  The table  distinguishes  between  NRB  and  HOS exports,  as 
classified above,  but  even for those  included  in the HOS  group other 
than  tires the availability of  domestically produced  raw materials was 
of  some influence in the location of  production. It is nevertheless inter- 
esting that NRB and HOS  exports  seem  to have fairly similar  factor 
proportions  on the average.  Indeed,  the more  systematic  distinctions 
Factor Utilization in Uruguayan Industry Table 11.10  Characteristics of  HOS Exportable Industries, 1968 
~  ~  ~  ___  ____~~~  ____  ___ 
Exports 
(Thousands of  U.S. Dollars) 
Factor Intensities 
Developed  Developing 
Countries  Countries  Total  Labora  Capitalb  Skillc 
202  Dairy products  853  32  885  67 9  2,914  413 
204  Fish-preserving  -  440  440  676  469  472 
234  Wool-spinning and weaving  2,316  963  3,279  1,615  897  164 
241  Footwear  94  -  94  570  437  247 
243  Clothing  57  -  57  43 6  250  203 
244  Textiles  7  1  8  489  279  27 6 
254  Parquets  8  23  31  481  849  253 
292  Leather products  659  -  659  530  563  25 1 
301  Tires  -  289  289  218  1,133  15 
332  Glass products  -  382  382  297  1,449  155 
334  Cement  -  3,579  3,579  21 1  5,498  101 
Total  3,994  5,709  9,703  366  1,483  163 
Source: Bension and Caumont (1977). 
*Number of  persons employed per million dollars of  DVA. 
bThousands of  kilowatt-hours  per million dollars of  DVA. 
CNumber  of  unskilled workers per million dollars of  DVA. 520  Alberto Bension/Jorge Caumont 
Table 11.11  Characteristics of  Major Importable Industries 
1968 Imports  Factor Intensitiesn 
(Thousands of 
Sector  U.S. Dollars)  Labor  Capital  Skill 
205  Grain products  3,036  171  1,200  109 
207  Sugar products  3,110  252  1,038  166 
220  Tobacco products  2,567  34  86  19 
302  Molded  rubber products  172  265  1,245  52 
3 11 Industrial chemicals  12,858  234  5,150  100 
3 16 Pharmaceuticals  9,389  187  224  78 
35  Metal produtcs  1,816  373  1,303  176 
37  Electrical machinery  5,973  336  1,032  166 
39  Various  4,229  329  1,094  172 
Total  43,501  238  1,163  116 
3 15 Household  chemical products  35 1  287  57 1  121 
Source: Bension and Caumont (1977). 
"See table  11.10 for definitions of  factor intensities. 
appear to be (1  ) that exportables, both NRB and HOS, use more labor, 
particularly  more  unskilled  labor,  than  import-competing  goods,  and 
(2) that  exports  to  developed  countries  use  more  labor,  particularly 
more unskilled  labor, than exports to developing countries.6 These ob- 
servations are in line with what one would expect on theoretical grounds. 
It must be borne in mind,  however,  that import-competing  goods  are 
preponderantly  produced  at  home  rather  than  imported.  Hence  one 
could not  conclude that Uruguay's  pattern  of  production  has not been 
seriously distorted. 
A  part  of  the explanation  for the relatively  low labor  intensity  of 
Uruguay's  imports of HOS goods and of  her exports of  such goods to 
LDCs ,compared with those to DCs lies in the pattern of  her trade with 
LAFTA  and  especially with  her neighbors  Argentina  and Brazil.  Be- 
cause of  preferential tariff  systems, there are several domestic industries 
that import parts or semifinished unassembled goods from those coun- 
tries and assemble the final product. That is the case, for example, with 
the  automobile  and household  electric  appliance  industries.  Since the 
factor endowments of  Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay are fairly similar, 
it is evident that the non-NRB trade between them owes its origins more 
to special factors such as tariff preferences than to any natural compara- 
tive advantage. 
Note  that  table  11.12  (and also table  11.13)  does not  distinguish 
between DCs and LDCs in showing factor coefficients for import-com- 
peting goods, unlike the breakdown shown for exports. It is questionable Table 11.12  Direct Factor Utilization per Million Dollars of  DVA, 1968 
Number of  Workers 
Wage Bill  Hours 
(Thousands  White-  Blue-  Unskilled  Worked  Kilowatt-Hours 
of  Dollars)  Total  Collar  Collar  Workers  (Thousands)  (Thousands) 
NRB exports 
Developed countries  664 (599)  365  45  320  252  55 1  1,339 
Developing countries  438 (519)  179  2  177  128  370  1,731 
Total  642 (571)  346  40  306  240  53  3  1,378 
Developed countries  771 (631)  44 1  48  393  215  932  915 
Developing countries  506 (537)  239  43  196  76  3  52  2,573 
Total  673 (586)  366  46  320  163  712  1,483 
Total  453 (520)  238  49  189  116  344  1,163 
HOS exports 
Import-competing HOS goods 
Source: Bension and Caumont (1977). 
Note:  Conversions of  value added and wage bill are made at official rate of  exchange. 
BFigures in parentheses are direct plus home goods indirect wages per million dollars at direct plus home goods indirect value added, 522  Albert0 Bension/Jorge Caumont 
how meaningful such a distinction would be for Uruguay’s imports. This 
is because, to repeat,  Uruguayan protection  of  domestic production  is 
so great that, once a good is domestically produced, imports are gener- 
ally not permitted, and the only observed imports in the relevant sectors 
are presumably those of  inputs for the domestic industry. It is probable, 
however,  that  most  of  these industries produce  what would  otherwise 
be imported from developed countries. 
To estimate factor coefficients for noncompeting imports, the ratio of 
wages to value added in the industrial sectors was calculated both for 
the  United  States  and  for Uruguay  at the three-digit  level.  For  this 
category-including  industries within the metal-manufacturing,  machin- 
ery,  electrical  appliances,  and  transportation  equipment  sectors-the 
ratio of  the wages share to that in other industries was calculated for the 
United States, and that ratio was then applied to the Uruguayan wage 
share in  other  industries. The resulting  estimate,  534,000  dollars per 
million  dollars  of  DVA, can  be  compared  with  the data in  the first 
column of  table 11.10. To the extent that the wage share is an accurate 
reflection of  labor intensity (though it reflects human capital in the form 
of  skills as well as the number of workers per unit of  value  added), it 
appears that the wage share in the noncompeting  import categories, if 
these  products  were  domestically  produced,  would  lie  somewhere  be- 
tween that for import-competing  goods and that for exportables. Uru- 
guayan  exportables therefore  appear  to  be labor-intensive  relative to 
both import-competing  and noncompeting imports. 
Home goods indirect inputs can be brought into the calculations only 
for wages, the results  (in terms  of  aggregate wages per million dollars 
of  DVA) being  shown  in  parentheses  in  the  wages column  of  table 
11.10. On this basis, Uruguayan exports still use more labor than im- 
port-competing goods, though  the difference is smaller  than  for direct 
inputs only. The reason for this change is that, per unit of  DVA, indirect 
labor incorporated in home goods is less than the direct labor in export 
production but greater than that in import-competing production. Simi- 
larly,  the  previously  observed  excess  of  labor  requirements  in  HOS 
exports to  developed countries compared with that in HOS exports to 
developing countries is narrowed, but not eliminated, when indirect in- 
puts are included. 
11.3.4 
Two alternative courses are possible when passing from domestic to 
international value added in the case of  industries that produce for the 
foreign as well as for the domestic market. The first is to work with the 
effective rate of  protection  as computed from tariffs and other charges 
on imports. The other is to consider the ERP that results from the sub- 
sidy to exports of  the same commodity. In Uruguay, we will argue, the 
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ERP implicitly given by  the nominal rate of  the subsidy to exports is a 
more accurate way of  handling the problem and gives a more meaning- 
ful result. 
Starting  with  the  competitive  market  case  and  making  the small- 
country assumption, if  a tariff  is imposed on imports of  a certain com- 
modity, domestic market  equilibrium without  exports is achieved when 
Ql units of  the commodity are produced and sold at a price Po. In figure 
11.1, D,  S, P,,  t, and  s  are, respectively, domestic  demand, domestic 
supply, the world price, the nominal  rate of  the tariff, and the nominal 
rate of  the subsidy. 
In this case, part of  the tariff is redundant because PD,  which is below 
P,  ( 1 +  t),  clears the domestic market. At the price P,  (1 +  t),  the 
excess supply  (Q3 -  Q2) would not be absorbed and the price would 
fall. 
In order for exports to take place  (and ignoring the c.i.f.-f.0.b.  mar- 
gin),  domestic  producers  need  a  subsidy  whose  rate  should  be high 
enough to make P,, less than P,o  (1 +  s). At that new price, producers 
are able to sell Q5 units, Q4 of  which are sold to the domestic market 
and (Q5 -  Q4) to the rest of  the world. 
quantity  Q2  Q4  Ql  QS  Q3 
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The situation  depicted  above shows  that,  if  the ERP given  by  the 
tariff is used in adjusting DVA to IVA, effective protection will be over- 
estimated and IVA calculated from it will be underestimated. In contrast 
to that procedure, figure 1  1.1 indicates that a more accurate description 
of  the real world is achieved when P, (1 +  s)  is considered as the do- 
mestic price and the price seen by domestic producers. Hence, the ERP 
given by the nominal rate s should be the one chosen to pass from DVA 
to IVA. 
For the monopolistic case  the situation  is  different.  In figure  11.2, 
MC and MR  are, respectively, marginal cost and marginal revenue. The 
profit-maximizing  solution for  the  monopolist  producing  only  for  the 
domestic market is a scale of  production of  Q1 units with a price of PO. 
According  to figure  11.2, the tariff  is  excessively high  and therefore 
implies an overestimate of  effective protection. 
For exports to take place, the monopolist needs a subsidy whose rate 
should be higher than the one  (i) that makes MC =  MR for Ql units. 
price 
MC’ 
I  I  \D 
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However,  s  could be such that P,  (1 +  s)  is less  than  PD.  With that 
rate of  subsidy the monopolist  is  able to produce Q2 units in addition 
to the Ql units he produces for the domestic market. MC’  is the excess 
domestic supply. 
For this case one would be tempted to pass from domestic to inter- 
national value added using just an average of  the effective rate given by 
the tariff and the one given by the subsidy weighted by the monopolist’s 
sales to domestic and foreign markets. However, that is not quite right. 
In  this special case the shaded area P, ABC represents monopoly profits 
accruing to the monopolist when he produces for the domestic market. 
Even  though  these  monopoly  profits  exist  because  of  the tariff,  they 
would disappear if  the monopolist’s rights were canceled or the franchise 
withdrawn. 
Domestic value  added including monopoly  profits  is  not  the appro- 
priate measure because the franchise,  and not the tariff, gives that im- 
plicit protection. The DVA that should be considered should not include 
extraordinary profits. 
If  the monopoly is exporting because of  the  subsidy,  then the ERP 
resulting from that rate should be taken as the one pointing to a more 
accurate  description  of  the industry  protection. No franchise  effect is 
present  in  this  case that should count for some of  the  protection  the 
industry receives. 
Once the IVA is obtained, it is assumed that no variations exist either 
in the number of  employed persons, in the hours worked, or in the wage 
bill, with respect to the figures considered for the case of  the domestic 
value added. 
The results are given in table 11.13. Direct capital and labor employ- 
ment  in  terms  of  IVA  shows  that capital  and  labor  requirements  in 
import-competing  industries  are  both  larger than  in  the  HOS  export 
industries, and the same conclusion is reached whatever the index con- 
sidered. This is clear evidence of  the inefficiency of  the import-compet- 
ing industrial sector. 
11.4  Conclusions 
Uruguayan  import-competing industries grew from the end of  World 
War I1 until  the end of  the  1950s, after which  a period  of  stagnation 
ensued. Protected by very high tariffs and other charges and by import 
prohibitions, these industries appear, on the basis of  estimates for 1968, 
to have used much less labor per unit of  DVA than did either HOS or 
NRB exportable industries. Expressed per unit of  IVA, however, import- 
competing industries used both  more labor  and more capital,  attesting 
to the overall inefficiency engendered by the import substitution policy. 
As  Uruguayan  policies  have shifted toward  encouraging exports in the Table 11.13  Direct Factor Utilization per Million Dollars of  IVA 
Number of  Workers 
Wages  Hours 
(Thousands  White-  Blue-  Unskilled  Worked  Kilowatt-Hours 
of Dollars)  Total  Collar  Collar  Workers  (Thousands)  (Thousands) 
NRB exports 
Developed countries  832  456  56  400  3 16  690  1,677 
Developing countries  840  345  4  341  245  710  3,324 
Total  832  449  52  397  311  690  1,786 
HOS exports 
Developed countries  1,238  707  77  630  344  1,495  1,468 
Total  1,140  620  78  542  277  1,206  2,511 
Developing countries  946  446  81  365  141  629  4,595 
Import-competing HOS goods 
Total'  1,780  934  192  742  45 6  1,352  4,576 
Source: Bension and Caumont (1977). 
Note:  Calculated as described in the text, using data in table 11.12. 527  Uruguay: Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment Implications 
1970s, it is quite possible  that the demands  for various categories  of 
skilled and unskilled labor will grow in the future quite differently from 
their historical trends. 
In that regard, it is important to note that one of  the chief  findings 
of  this analysis is the very large and significant difference between factor 
proportions  in HOS exportables to developed  and to developing coun- 
tries, the former being considerably more labor-intensive than the latter. 
Certainly the available data strongly  indicate that  the nature of  Uru- 
guay’s trade with her neighbors in LAFTA is quite different from the 
nature of her trade with developed  countries, even when  attention fo- 
cuses on HOS goods. 
This study really represents  a first step in the analysis of  Uruguay’s 
trade  and payments regime  and  of  her domestic factor  markets,  and 
there is considerable scope for future work. While the commodity mar- 
ket  distortions inherent in  the trade regime  were  quantified  to some- 
extent  in  our  estimates of  effective rates  of  protection,  we  have  not 
reported any results with respect to distortions in Uruguayan factor mar- 
kets. Although a few pieces of  data are available, it will require consid- 
erable further study before  any conclusions  can be reached  about the 
extent  to  which  Uruguayan  factor  markets  and  factor  prices  reflect 
underlying market forces. We did, for this study, attempt to analyze the 
wage structure as it existed in  1968, but data difficulties proved  over- 
whelming:  not only were data on skill and experience variables inade- 
quate, but the 60 percent inflation that occurred in that year undoubt- 
edly distorted the reported nominal  wages, depending on the timing of 
wage adjustments as much as anything else. There are also significant 
differences in the observed labor intensity of  large and small firms, with 
small firms employing fewer than ten workers in each two-digit industry 
having  a higher  share of  wages in value  added than the firms with  a 
larger number of  employees, and also that much remains to be done in 
analyzing the determinants of  factor utilization in Uruguayan industries 
as well  as in estimating the way they interact with the trade and pay- 
ments regime  and the observed  commodity composition  of  trade.  The 
available evidence, however,  is all consistent with  the hypothesis  that 
the  switch to a more  export-oriented  strategy should result in greater 
demand for labor. 
Notes 
1. Because  of  the  balance  of  payments  difficulties during  that  period,  capital 
goods imports were subject to prior government  authorization. 528  Alberto Bension/Jorge Caumont 
2.  The share increased  again in  1974-75,  even  though  imports of  meat  by the 
EEC  were  drastically reduced,  since nontraditional  exports  more  than  offset the 
drop. 
3.  The trend  changed in 1975-76  as nontraditional  exports to the United States 
rose sharply.  In 1976 the share was  11 percent. 
4.  For a discussion of  the nature of  Uruguayan inflation, see Harberger (1974). 
5.  For the NRB industries, the ERPs are based on a rough estimate of the input- 
output relationship  and are not strictly  speaking  consistent  with  the  others.  For 
machinery  (36), no firm data giving an average nominal  rate of  protection  were 
available, and we assumed that the nominal rate of  protection was 60 percent. 
6.  Rather surprisingly at first  sight, the amount of  electricity used  per  unit  of 
DVA appears to be  substantially higher  in export  industries than in import-com- 
peting  industries,  seeming to suggest that the first are more capital-intensive  than 
the second insofar as energy consumption reflects capital utilization. The explana- 
tion lies, however, in the exceptionally high energy requirements of  cement manu- 
factures exported to developing countries. If  that industry were excluded from the 
computation-and  it is, in any event, arguable whether cement should be classified 
as HOS  or NRB-the  total  kilowatt-hours  consumed  per  unit  of  DVA  in  HOS 
exports would  be  about  14 percent  lower than that in import-competing  produc- 
tion.  Other factor  coefficients for  exports  shown  in  table  11.10  are not  greatly 
affected by the inclusion or exclusion of  cement. 
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